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THE ARTICULATION OF NATIVE RIGHTS
IN CANADIAN LAW
MICHAEL JACKSONt
INTRODUCTION
The natural focus of any discussion in common law jurisdictions on
the contribution of the social sciences to the reform of procedural
law is the courts. In the common law tradition it is in the context of
litigation presided over by an independent judiciary that a frame-
work for the articulation and enforcement of legal rights has de-
veloped. In the twentieth century there has been, however, a great
elaboration of the forums which are used in the development, inter-
pretation and application of legal rights. In Canada the jurisdiction
of the courts has been supplemented, and in some cases all but
replaced, by administrative boards dealing with such vitally impor-
tant matters as labour relations, workers' compensation and social
welfare entitlements. Also, both federal and provincial governments
have made increasing use of commissions of inquiry to investigate
and report on a wide range of issues affecting legal rights. These
commissions are often headed by Superior Court judges, lending
the imprimatur of an independent judiciary to the commissions'
work. The enabling legislation under which these commissions of
inquiry are established gives the commissioners considerable discre-
tion in how they conduct the hearings and otherwise gather evi-
dence. Commissioners are authorized to issue subpoenae to compel
t Of the Faculty of Law, University of British Columbia. An earlier version
of this article was presented as the Canadian contribution to the VIIth
International Congress on Procedural Law: The Contribution of Social Sci-
ences to the Reform of Procedural Law held in Wurzburg, Federal Republic
of Germany, September 1983. Reprinted in Gunter H. Roth (ed.), RECHTS-
SOZIOLOGIE UND PROZESSRECHT (Vienna, Orac 1983) at 223-44.
() Michael Jackson, 1984.
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the attendance of witnesses and to appoint legal counsel to act on
behalf of the Commission.'
Because of the wide discretion given to the commissioners with
respect to the conduct of hearings, commissions of inquiry are ca-
pable of receiving evidence which might not be admissible in a
court of law operating within the confines of the technical rules of
evidence. Also, because the terms of reference of commissions of
inquiry may be much wider than the very narrow focus which
typically characterizes a cause of action before the courts, a com-
mission may hear evidence which might well be deemed irrevelant
in a court case dealing with the same subject matter. Commissions
of inquiry typically are concerned with developing "the big picture"
while courts focus the issues before them as narrowly as possible
and limit consideration of the law and the evidence to those mat-
ters essential to a resolution of the dispute. In seeking to develop
"the big picture" commissions of inquiry have introduced new pro-
cedural mechanisms to ensure that there is a full flow of information
coming before the inquiry, procedures which a court of law would
not countenance.
In this article I will be reviewing the work of a major commission
of inquiry established by the Federal Government of Canada in
1974 to consider the environmental, social and economic impact of
the then proposed Mackenzie Valley natural gas pipeline on the
land and people in the Yukon and the Northwest Territories-
Canada's northland. This commission of inquiry, which is com-
monly referred to as the Mackenzie Valley Pipeline Inquiry, was
presided over by Mr. Justice Thomas Berger, a judge of the Su-
preme Court of British Columbia. One of the principal issues which
quickly emerged in the work of the Inquiry was that of the legal
and political rights of the aboriginal peoples of the North. One of
the most significant contributions of the Inquiry was the establish-
ment of new procedures which permitted a clear and comprehensive
articulation by the aboriginal peoples of how they understood their
rights. These procedures were not developed on an a priori basis
but were derived from the volksgeist and law ways of the aboriginal
people. These procedures in turn resulted in the substance of abo-
x For a discussion of the Canadian legal framework relating to public com-
missions of inquiry, see G. Le Dain, The Role of the Public Inquiry in our
Constitutional System, in Jacob S. Ziegel (ed.), LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE
(1973); Law Reform Commission Canada Working Paper 17 COMMISSION
OF INQUIRY (1978); Law Reform Commission of Canada, REPORT ON AD-
VISORY AND INVESTIGATORY COMMISSIONS (1979).
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riginal rights or, as they are generally termed, "native rights", being
given a radical content; radical in the sense that the rights as articu-
lated by native peoples, while much broader than those which have
been recognized by Canadian courts, reflected the original principles
which had governed the relationships between aboriginal peoples
and the European colonialists who came amongst them some 400
years ago. An analysis of the Mackenzie Valley Pipeline Inquiry in
the context of the articulation of native rights provides, therefore,
an opportunity not only to assess within the sociology of law the
important role of commissions of inquiry in developing new pro-
cedural forums but also to better understand the close relationship
between procedural and substantive rights as revealed in the his-
torical evolution of native rights in Canada.
PART I: THE EVOLUTION OF NATIVE RIGHTS
IN CANADA
A. NATvE RIGHTS IN THE COLONIAL PERIOD, 16oo-1763: THE
PRINCIPLE OF CONSENT AS THE CONNECTING FACTOR BETWEEN
PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE LAW
The connection between procedural and substantive law is well
illustrated in the early history of native rights in what is now North
America. As one English commentator has observed:
It is never quite clear whether the rules of law were sanctioned by
an appropriate procedure or whether the rules were developed to
explain existing procedure; the truth no doubt in many cases was
that law and procedure grew together.2
The procedures within which the rights of the Indian tribes of
North America were asserted and recognized in colonial law were
significantly related to the substance of those rights. The principle
of consent was the connecting factor between substance and pro-
cedure. It was through the process of consensual treaty-making, in
which Indian tribes were recognized as independent nations, that
the terms of European settlement and the tribes' continued occupa-
tion of their hunting territories were mutually agreed. The basic
principle which emerged was that, save for lands that were un-
2 A. W. B. Simpson, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY OF THE LAND LAW
(i96I), at 43. See also the much quoted statement by Sir Henry Maine,
"Substantive Law has at first the look of being gradually secreted in the
intestices of procedure"; Sir H. S. Maine, DISSERTATIONS ON EARLy LAW
AND CUSTOM (856), at 386.
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occupied or which were acquired by conquest, the consent of the
Indian tribes was a prerequisite to the occupation of lands used by
the tribes. Similarly, the tribes' right to self-government would not
be interfered with save by their express consent. That the principle
of consent lay at the heart both of the substance of Indian rights
and of the procedures by which such rights were acquired by the
European settlers is clearly expressed in some of the later Charters
of the English colonies in North America. The Rhode Island Char-
ter of 1663 indicates that the petitioners, upon arriving in America,
settled amidst certain Indians, "who, are the most potent princes
and people of that country. The petitioners are now seized and
possessed, by purchase and consent of the said natives, to their full
content."3
The evolution of the principle of consent in colonial law is well
illustrated in the treaties which were negotiated in the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries on the eastern seaboard of what is now the
United States. These treaties show the acceptance by certain of the
Indian tribes of a formal protectorate relationship with the English
Crown, reserving to the tribes important powers of tribal sovereignty
and rights to sell or retain all or part of their traditional lands.
The treaties and compacts concluded with the Iroquois Confederacy
in the eighteenth century most clearly articulate the nature of native
rights in colonial law.' The westward expansion of settlement among
the British colonies of New England during the eighteenth century
and the violation of Indian territorial integrity became a major
issue for the colonial authorities. By mid-century, the group of the
Six Nations of the Iroquois Confederacy, because of its military
strength and political organization, was viewed as the lynch-pin
in the security of the British colonies. Their military support, to
either the French in Canada or to the British colonies, would
threaten the stability, if not the existence, of the other colonial em-
pires. The onset of the Seven Years' War with France in 1754
heightened British awareness of the strategic role which the Indian
nations played in relation to the two European combatants.
Recent research into the role of the Indian nations during the
3 F. N. Thorpe, THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHAR-
TERS AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS (1909), vol. I, at 529.
4 For an excellent review and analysis of these documents see B. Slattery, THE
LAND RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS CANADIAN PEOPLES AS AFFECTED BY THE
CROWN'S ACQUISITION OF THEIR TERRITORIES (D. Phil. thesis, Oxford Uni-
versity, 1979, reprinted by the University of Saskatchewan Native Law Centre,
1979).
NATIVE RIGHTS
Seven Years' War between England and France not only documents
the crucial role that the Indian nations played in the major cam-
paigns of the war but also shows that negotiations with the Indians
proceeded upon the assumption that they were independent nations
capable of pursuing their own foreign policies.' Sir William John-
son, the representative of the British Crown, charged with the pri-
mary responsibility of engaging in diplomatic negotiations with -the
Indian nations, became convinced that the Indian alliance could
only be assured by incorporating Indian policy into "a solemn pub-
lic treaty to agree upon clear and fixed boundaries between our
settlements and their hunting grounds so that each party may know
their own and be a mutual protection to each other of their respec-
tive possessions." In 1758, at Easton in Pennsylvania, a conference
was convened which attracted one of the largest and most repre-
sentative cross-sections of Indian delegates ever to assemble in one
council. Spokesmen for each of the Six Nations, the Delawares of
the Susquehanna and several other tribes of northern and western
Pennsylvania, met with representatives of the colonial and British
authorities to hammer out the terms of the continuing alliance
between the tribes and the British. Many of the terms of this treaty,
reached by mutual accord, were later to be restated in the famous
Royal Proclamation of 1763 which has been described as the Magna
Carta of native rights in North America.
In 1763, at the conclusion of the Seven Years' War, Britain
acquired from the French, through the Treaty of Paris, the French
colony of Canada as well as the islands of Cape Breton and
St. John (Prince Edward Island). Following the signing of the
Treaty of Paris, the British Government sought to address the
issues arising from the peace, in particular the organization of
the newly acquired territories and the establishment of a consoli-
dated policy with the Indian nations. Both of these objectives were
embodied in the Royal Proclamation of 1763. The Proclamation
is unilateral in form; however, in its provisions dealing with Indian
policy, it is a restatement of the principles which had been previ-
ously embodied in compacts with the various Indian nations. Thus
the Proclamation acknowledges the protectorate obligation of the
Crown towards the Indian nations and recognizes that lands pos-
sessed by the Indian nations anywhere in British North America are
reserved to them unless and until ceded to the Crown. This terri-
5 J. Stagg, ANoLo-INDIN RELATIONS IN NORTH AMERICA TO 1763 AND AN
ANALYSIS OF THE ROYAL PROCLAMATION OF 1763 (1981).
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torial integrity is protected by restrictions on grants, settlements and
purchases. The Proclamation also closes large parts of North Amer-
ica to settlement, reserving them for the use of the Indian nations
as their hunting territories, subject to the right of the Crown to
acquire the land with Indian consent. These tracts are designated
as free trade zones. The recital to the Proclamation states:
And whereas it is just and reasonable, and essential to Our Interest
and the Security of Our Colonies, that the several Nations or Tribes
of Indians, with whom We are connected, and who live under Our
Protection, should not be molested or disturbed in the Possession of
such Parts of Our Dominions and Territories as, not having been
ceded to, or purchased by Us, are reserved to them, or any of them,
as their Hunting Grounds .. .
It is important to understand the comprehensiveness of this re-
cital. It provides the clearest recognition that Indian nations have
rights to territorial integrity in all those areas of North America
in which they retain possession of their traditional lands, and where
they have not entered into treaties of cession with the Crown for
the consensual acquisition of those lands by the Crown.
The Royal Proclamation also formalized the procedure for the
acquisition of Indian lands required for future settlement. The prin-
ciple of consent is firmly entrenched again in this procedure, which
required that any purchase be made in the name of the Crown at a
public meeting or assembly held by the Governor or Commander-
in-Chief of the colony.
When the English Lords of Trade were asked to prepare the
Royal Proclamation of 1763 they were also requested to prepare a
"general plan to regulate the conduct of free trade with the Indians
of North America." A "Plan For The Future Management of Indian
affairs" was consequently transmitted to the two Superintendents
of Indian Affairs. The forty-second clause of the plan provides:
That proper measures be taken with the consent and concurrence
of the Indians to ascertain and define the precise and exact boun-
dary and limits of the lands which it may be proper to reserve to
them and where no settlement whatsoever shall be allowed. 7
This principle was implemented by further communication of the
6 Reprinted in R.S.C. 197o, Appendices, at 123-29, and cited in K. M. Narvey,
The Royal Proclamation of 7 October r763, the Common Law and Native
Rights within the Territory Granted to the Hudson's Bay Company (1973)
38 SASix. L. REv. 123, at 130.
7 Id., at I40 (emphasis added).
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Lords of Trade in a letter to the King of England on the 7th of
March, 1768. They reported:
In a plan for the management of the Indian affairs prepared by this
Board in 1764, the fixing a boundary between the settlements of
Your Majesty's subjects and the Indian country was proposed to be
established by compact with the Indians, as essentially necessary to
the gaining of their goodwill and affection and to preserving the
tranquility of the colonies.8
The Lords of Trade communication provides the clearest evidence
that the implementation of the Royal Proclamation was conceived
as a compact between the Indian nations and the Crown.
B. THE TREATY-MAKING PROCESS IN THE NINETEENTH
CENTURY: THE DIssONANcE BETWEEN THE INDIAN AND
EURO-CANADIAN LEGAL TRADITIONS
It is the procedure formalized by the Royal Proclamation of 1763
which has provided the constitutional basis for the hundreds of land
cession treaties which have since been negotiated with the Indian
nations across much of Canada. Up until 1850, the treaties covered
relatively small areas and the terms of the treaty were limited in
scope. In the period after x85o, as settlement moved westward,
there was a dramatic increase in geographical scale. Moreover, post-
1850 treaties contain provisions relating to the establishment of
Indian reserves, Indian education and medical services, the pay-
ment of annuities and the supply of agricultural and farm imple-
ments as well as ammunition and twine for use in hunting and
fishing. The treaties also guarantee to the Indians their continuing
right to hunt, fish and trap.
Recent research undertaken by the Indian nations themselves,
with the help of social scientists, 'has revealed some of the conti-
nuities between the treaty negotiations involving the Indian nations
of western Canada in the late nineteenth century and the negotia-
tions involving the Iroquois Confederacy in the previous century in
the eastern colonies. As with the treaties negotiated in the eighteenth
century with the Iroquois, the post-confederation treaties negotiated
by the Indian nations of western Canada were viewed by them as
establishing compacts to deal with the issues of territorial and politi-
cal integrity within the framework of a protectorate relationship
with the Crown. However, what had changed in the intervening
century was the balance of power between the Indian nations and
8 Id., at 142.
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the colonial authorities, and the condition of the Indians as the
result of the encroachment of European civilization. More specifi-
cally, the Indians were facing increasing white settlement, devastat-
ing epidemics, the influx of whisky traders and the disappearance
of the buffalo, the staple of the tribes' economy. The protectorate
role embodied in the treaties was accordingly not confined, in the
Indians' eyes, to preserving their territorial and political integrity
within the lands which they were not prepared to cede, but also
extended to the protection of the traditional Indian economy and
assistance in the development of new forms of Indian economic
self-sufficiency.'
The Canadian Government had a different view of what the
treaties were intended to accomplish. They did not regard them as
anything like a social contract in which different ways of life were
to be accommodated within mutually acceptable limits. The govern-
ment regarded the treaties primarily as the surrender of Indian
rights to their land so that settlement and development could pro-
ceed. The payment of annuities, the provision of agricultural im-
plements, the offers of medical and educational services and the
establishment of reserves were conceived of in part as compensation
but primarily as the means of change. The government's expectation
was that a backward people would, in time, abandon their semi-
nomadic ways and, with the benefit of the white man's religion,
education and agriculture, take their place in the mainstream of the
economic and political life of Canada.
As the result of the recent research conducted by Indian nations
it has now become clear that the dissonance between the Indian
understanding of the treaties and the government's understanding,
as that is reflected in the text of the treaties, is directly related to
the different legal conceptions about how agreements are negotiated,
recorded and interpreted. For the Indian negotiators, who brought
to the negotiations an oral tradition, the promises and discussions
during the negotiations formed the centrepiece of the agreements.
For the negotiators on the Canadian Government's side, it was the
written text of the treaty which determined its scope and meaning.
It has also become clear from the Indian nations' research that
basic Indian values relating to the sharing of resources and distinc-
tive concepts about the nature of land informed their view of the
treaty negotiations. According to the text of Treaty #6, which was
For an excellent review of the Indian understanding of the 19th century
treaties, see D. Opekokew, THE FIRST NATIONS: INDIAN GOVERNMENT AND
THE CANADIAN CONFEDERATION (1980), ch. 2.
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negotiated in 1876, the Indians, in the language of the treaty,
"hereby cede, release, surrender and yield up to the Government
of the Dominion of Canada for Her Majesty the Queen and her
successors forever, all their rights, titles and privileges whatsoever,
to the lands included within the following limits." A more compre-
hensive surrender of rights would be difficult to draft. Compare this
wording in the text of the treaty with the statement made by Chief
Crowfoot during the treaty negotiations:
Our land is more valuable than your money. It will last forever.
It will not perish as long as the sun shines and the waters flow, and
through all the years it will give life to men and beasts.
We cannot sell the lives of men and animals and therefore, we can-
not sell the land. It was put here by the Great Spirit and we cannot
sell it, because it does not really belong to us. You can count your
money and burn it with the nod of a buffalo's head, but only the
Great Spirit can count the grains of sand and the blades of grass on
these plains. As a present to you, we will give you anything we have
that you can take with you, but the land we cannot give.'0
The divergence between the text of the treaty and the Indians'
understanding of the negotiations is illustrated in other areas. The
treaty commissioners negotiated with the chiefs of the tribes. The
terms of the treaties provide for annual payments to each member
of the tribe, with larger payments for the chiefs. The chiefs also were
provided with medals. To the Indians, in the context of negotiations
in which their tribal governments negotiated with the Government
of the Queen, these provisions affirmed the authority of their tribal
governments and provided a diplomatic protocol for the annual
review of the treaty agreements. The text of the treaty provides that
each tribe shall be provided with a specific number of agricultural
resources such as ploughs, scythes, oxen, cows and other farming
animals. To the Indian negotiators, this was understood in terms
of the protectorate relationship as a clause of economic aid, a
prototype for the treaties of economic assistance which are now
regularly entered into by the richer western countries with their
allies in the Third World. The Indian negotiators understood these
clauses to be a sharing by the white man of his forms of economic
development to assist the Indian nations as they experienced increas-
ing hardship in maintaining their traditional economies in the face
of increased settlement."
10 Id., at 12.
11 Id., ch. 5.
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In one area the divergence between the text of the treaty and
the oral negotiations has been specifically acknowledged by the
treaty commissioners who negotiated on behalf of the Canadian
Government. The Indian nations were insistent throughout the
treaty negotiations that their traditional economy based upon hunt-
ing, fishing and trapping be protected. Recent research has shown
that some of the treaty negotiations would have broken down had
not the government negotiators given guarantees that hunting, fish-
ing and trapping rights would not be curtailed.' However, the
actual text of the treaties in relation to these rights is qualified. In
Treaty # 8, for example, the clause reads,
And Her Majesty the Queen hereby agrees with the said Indians
that they shall have the right to pursue their usual vocations of
hunting, trapping and fishing throughout the tract surrendered...
subject to such regulations as may from time to time be made by the
Government of the country, . . . and saving and excepting such tracts
as may be required or taken up from time to time for settlement,
mining, lumbering, trading or other purposes. (emphasis added) '
The treaty commissioners, in their report to the Government of
Canada, make specific reference to the oral negotiations regarding
the hunting, fishing and trapping rights clause:
Our chief difficulty was the apprehension that the hunting and fish-
ing privileges were to be curtailed. The provision in the treaty under
which ammunition and twine is to be furnished went far in the
direction of quieting the fears of the Indians... but over and above
the provision, we had to solemnly assure them that only such laws
as to hunting and fishing as were in the interest of the Indians and
were found necesary in order to protect the fish and furbearing
animals would be made, and that they would be as free to hunt and
fish after the treaty as they would be if they never entered into it....
We assured them that any treaty would not lead to any forced inter-
ference with their mode of life... The Indians were generally ad-
verse to being placed on reserves - it would have been impossible to
have made a treaty if we had not assured them that there was no
intention of confining them to reserves. 4
In the eighteenth century, in the context of English and French
colonial rivalry and Indian military strength, the Indian nations in
12 R. Fumoleau, As LONG As THIS LAND SHALL LAST: A HISTORY OF TREATY
8 AND TREATY II, 1870-1939 (1975); see also R. Price, THE SPIRIT OF THE
ALBERTA INDIAN TREATIES (1979).
13 Treaty No. 8, 1899, Id., at 71-72.
14 REPORT OF TREATY COMMISSIONERS, Treaty No. 8, at 84-85 (emphasis
added).
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the eastern parts of North America had the power to compel the
colonial governments with whom they negotiated treaties to respect
their understanding of these treaty negotiations. The Indians in the
west of Canada, one hundred years later, lacked this power to
compel. Government Indian policy proceeded along lines which
breached the Indians' understanding of their treaties: the role of
traditional Indian governments was replaced by the authority of
Indian agents, traditional religious ceremonies were prohibited and
punished as offences, the traditional Indian economies were under-
mined by the encroachment of agriculture development and game
laws, and the promised agricultural economic assistance was not
forthcoming. In the years since the signing of these treaties, when
Indian nations have gone to the courts to enforce their rights under
the treaties, the Canadian courts have, with rare exceptions, looked
to the literal text of the treaties and have disregarded the oral prom-
ises or the Indians' understanding of the negotiations.
The process of judicial revision of treaty rights as they were
understood by native peoples is well illustrated by cases interpreting
the relationship between federal and provincial game laws and In-
dian hunting. Notwithstanding the solemn assurances given by the
treaty commissioners that Indian hunting would not be interfered
with, the Canadian Government, in the years following the signing
of Treaty #8, passed legislation restricting native hunting and trap-
ping. In 1917, dosed seasons were established in the Northwest
Territories and Alberta on moose, cariboo and other animals essen-
tial to the economy of the Dene. In 1918, the Migratory Birds Con-
vention Act further restricted their hunting. The violation of the
treaty promises by this legislation has been recognized by Canadian
courts which, contrary to the Indians' conception of the binding
character of the treaties, have consistently held that treaty promises
may, as a matter of Canadian law, be abrogated by federal legisla-
tion without prior Indian consent. Canadian courts have thus sanc-
tioned the federal government's unilateral alteration of treaty prom-
ises.
15 R. v. Sikyea [5964] S.C.R. 642; R. v. George [1966] S.C.R. 267. For an-
other example of judicial focusing on the text of the treaty rather than the
oral understanding, see R. v. Johnston (1966) 56 D.L.R. (2d) 749 (SAsK.
C.A.) which deals with the "medicine chest" clause. See also R. Cumming
and N. Mickenberg, NATIVE RIGHTS IN CANADA (2nd ed. 5972), ch. 14. For
detailed accounts of the abrogation of the hunting and trapping guarantees
of Treaty #8 by federal and provincial legislation, see Fumoleau, supra, note
12 and H. Brady, MAPs AND DREAMS, INDIANS AND THE BRITISH COLUMBIA
FRONTIER (1981).
U.B.C. LAW REVIEW
C. NATIVE RIGHTS AS ARTICULATED BY THE CANADIAN COURTS:
THE PROCESS OF JUDICIAL REVISION
The Canadian courts have not only failed to adequately reflect
the Indians' understanding of the treaties but have also engaged in
a process of judicial revision of the original principles of native
rights. Those principles developed in the treaty relationships entered
into in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries received their first
judicial interpretation in decisions of the United States Supreme
Court in a series of judgments in the I82Os and 1830s, culminating
in the landmark decision of Chief Justice Marshall in Worcester v.
Georgia (1832 )."' This case reviewed the colonial law antecedents
of native rights in North America and affirmed that the Indian
tribes had legal rights to their lands which could only be acquired in
the name of the Crown by consensual cession by the Indians. Par-
alleling this principle of consent to the cession of lands was the
recognition that the Indians retained their rights to self-government
as nations, notwithstanding their assumption of a protectorate rela-
tionship with the colonial governments in North America.
Canadian courts, while purporting to rely upon the Marshall de-
cision, have departed from these principles in significant ways. The
Canadian courts have given no recognition to the principle of In-
dian self-government as a part of native rights. On the issue of
native rights to lands and resources traditionally used and occupied
by them, the Canadian courts have rejected the principle of consent
as the basis for the acquisition of these lands and resources.
In the leading case of St. Catherine Milling and Lumber Com-
pany v. The Queen (1889) ,' the Privy Council, while affirming the
existence of the concept of aboriginal or native title to the land
based on the Royal Proclamation of 1763, stated that "the tenure
of the Indians was a personal and usufructory right, dependent
upon the goodwill of the sovereign."' According to the interpreta-
tion which has been given to this passage in subsequent cases, native
rights to lands and resources are not in fact rights but rather privi-
leges which exist at the sufferance of the Crown. It is important to
note that the St. Catherine Milling case, which until 1973 provided
16 (1832) 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515. For analyses of the early United States cases
see R. Barsh and J. Henderson, THE ROAD: INDIAN TRIBES AND POLITICAL
LIBERTY (i980); H. Berman, The Concept of Aboriginal Rights in the Early
Legal History of the United States (978) 27 BuFF. L. REV. 63.
17 (1889) 14 A.C. 46 (J.C.P.C.).
18 Id., at 54.
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the judicial centrepiece for the Canadian concept of native rights,
involved a dispute between federal and provincial governments
arising from the ownership of lands which had been ceded by the
Salteaux Indians in a treaty; there was, however, no Indian repre-
sentation before the courts.
Subsequent to the St. Catherine Milling decision, in the wake of
government policy designed to assimilate the Indians, the Canadian
law of native rights went into an almost total eclipse. For example,
in the Province of British Columbia, where with a few exceptions
no treaties have ever been negotiated, the Indian nations found
themselves faced with land policies of the Provincial Government
which denied any entitlement of the Indians to their traditional
lands, the policy of the Federal Government which denied them the
right to maintain their traditional forms of government, and the
policies of missionaries which, assisted by penal legislation enacted
by the Federal Government, denied the Indians the right to main-
tain their most important religious ceremony, the Potlatch. The Pot-
latch, which is regarded by anthropologists as the hallmark of
Northwest Coast Indian distinctiveness, combining elements of reli-
gious, economic and social organization, became an outlawed insti-
tution for the participation in which (for example, by dancing at
the ceremony) Indian people were imprisoned in the 192os. As part
of this government policy of suppression and repression of the In-
dians' way of life, legislation was introduced in 1926, following a
Federal Parliamentary Committee Report which found that the In-
dians of British Columbia had no rights to their land, which made
it a criminal offence to raise funds for the purpose of pressing any
Indian claims.'9
Even in the face of such draconian legislation Indian leaders
never gave up their struggle to have their rights recognized. But
from the i 92OS until the early I970s the issue of native rights ceased
to be of major concern to Canadian politicians and ceased to exist
in the minds of the legal profession. As late as 1969 a Federal Gov-
ernment policy paper on the issue of aboriginal rights' claims stated
"These are so general and undefined that it is not realistic to think
19 S.C. 1927, C. 32, s. 6. For an overview of the history of the anti-potlatch
legislation and government land policies in British Columbia see M. Jackson,
The Rights of the Native People, in R. St. J. Macdonald and J. Humphrey
(eds.), THE PRACTICE OF FREEDOM: CANADIAN ESSAYS ON HUMAN RIGHTS
AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS (1979); see also R. Fisher, CONTACT AND
CONFLICT: INDIAN EUROPEAN RELATIONSHIPS IN BRITISH COLUMBIA 1774-
189o (1977); F. E. LaViolette, THE STRUGGLE FOR SURVIVAL: INDIAN CUL-
TURE AND THE PROTESTANT ETHIC IN BRITISH COLUMBIA (1973).
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of them as specific claims capable of remedy."'2 Indeed, in that
same year the Prime Minister of Canada, Mr. Trudeau, a lawyer
and former professor of law, stated in a speech in Vancouver:
Aboriginal rights, this really means saying "We were here before
you. You came and you took the land from us and perhaps you
cheated us by giving us some worthless things in return for vast
expanses of land and we want to reopen this question. We want you
to preserve our aboriginal rights and to restore them to us." And our
answer - it may not be the right one and may not be one which is
accepted ... our answer is 'No'. 2 '
In the same year as the Prime Minister so categorically denied the
legal viability of aboriginal rights, a case was initiated by the Nishga
Indian Nation in British Columbia (the Calder case) which was to
cause the federal government to acknowledge the historical and legal
reality of aboriginal rights to land. The Nishgas, who had never
signed a treaty of cession with either the colonial or Canadian gov-
ernments, sought a declaration that their aboriginal title to the Nass
Valley, their homeland, had never been extinguished. The Calder
case went to the Supreme Court of Canada which, in 1973, split on
this issue.2 Three judges held that the aboriginal title of the Nishgas
had been extinguished by colonial land legislation. Three other
judges held that the Nishga rights had not been extinguished. A
seventh judge held against the Nishgas on the purely procedural
point that they needed the fiat or permission of the government to
bring their case. While the Calder case is viewed as a major victory
for native people in restoring to the legal and political lexicon the
concept of aboriginal rights - all six judges who ruled on the merits
acknowledged that such a concept existed in law - it is important
to understand the limitations of the case from the perspective of the
original principle of consent. The three judges who ruled that the
Nishga aboriginal title had not been extinguished did so on the
basis that an aboriginal title to land, once proven to exist by evi-
dence of exclusive use and occupation by an Indian nation, could
only be extinguished by specific legislation which showed a clear
and plain intention to end the Indian rights. In the opinion of these
judges there was no such legislation in British Columbia. Those
20 STATEMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA ON INDIAN POLICY (1969).
21 Reprinted in NATIVE RIGHTS IN CANADA, supra, note 25, at 331-
22 (1973) 34 D.L.R. (3d) 145. For a discussion of the history of the Calder
case, see D. Sanders, The Nishga Case (973) 59 B.C. STUDIES 3; for a
detailed legal analysis, see K. Lysyk, The Indian Title Question in Canada:
An Appraisal in the Light of Calder (973) 5x CAN. B. REV. 450.
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judges who ruled in favour of the Nishgas did not, however, affirm
the principle that Nishga lands could only be taken with their con-
sent. The judgment in favour of the Nishgas conceives of their
claims in this way:
They claim the right to remain in possession themselves and to enjoy
the fruits of that possession. They do not deny the right of the
Crown to dispossess them but say the Crown has not done so.a
This statement is of great importance. It is quite clear that the
Nishga Nation, as a matter of fact, does dispute the right of Cana-
dian federal or provincial governments to dispossess them of their
homeland. They have always asserted, and continue to assert, that
their consent is a prerequisite to any changes in their territorial
rights within their traditional homeland. As a matter of law, assert-
ing their claims in court within the context of the Canadian juris-
prudence on native rights, they felt compelled to acknowledge that
their rights could be taken without their consent. The dissonance
between the Indians' understanding of their treaty rights and the
courts' interpretation of those rights is thus closely paralleled by
the dissonance in the non-treaty areas between native and judicial
articulation of aboriginal rights.
PART II: THE MACKENZIE VALLEY PIPELINE
INQUIRY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN
ALTERNATIVE FORUM FOR THE
ARTICULATION OF NATIVE RIGHTS
The lawyer who represented the Nishga Nation in the Calder case
was Thomas Berger. Shortly after his final argument in the case, he
was appointed to the Supreme Court of British Columbia. Several
years later, in 1974, he was asked by the Government of Canada to
act as the Commissioner of the Mackenzie Valley Pipeline Inquiry.
His mandate was to review the environmental, social and economic
impact of the largest privately funded industrial project ever pro-
posed in the western world, designed to bring natural gas from the
north slope of Alaska across the Yukon Territory and down the
Mackenzie Valley to markets in the United States. It was heralded
by government and industry as the megaproject of the century, one
which would show the measure of Canadian-U.S. economic co-
operation and one which would pay rich economic dividends to the
23 Id., at 174.
U.B.C. LAW REVIEW
economies of Canada and the United States. It was, however, a
project which was viewed with the greatest alarm by the native
people of the Canadian North who saw the project in apocolyptic
terms as the culmination of a process of cultural genocide.
Mr. Justice Berger, in carrying out his mandate, held a series of
preliminary hearings in which he sought advice on, among other
things, how he should go about conducting hearings in the North.
Representations were made to the Inquiry by organizations repre-
senting the Dene (the Indians of the Northwest Territories refer to
themselves as the Dene, meaning "the people"), the M6tis (the
descendants of the interrelationship of Indians and whites) and the
Inuit (or Eskimos). These groups proposed that the Inquiry hold
hearings in the communities in which the native people lived. Fur-
thermore they requested that these hearings not be held for at least
one year to permit the native organizations to provide information
to the communities concerning the proposed pipeline development
and in order to prepare fully for the hearings.
At these preliminary hearings the issue of whether native rights
were within the terms of reference of the Inquiry was raised by the
pipeline companies who argued that native rights was a matter to
be dealt with between the native people themselves and the Federal
Government of Canada and that the Inquiry was limited to the
assessment of environmental, social and economic impact with a
view to recommending terms and conditions to be imposed upon the
pipeline companies. Terms and conditions relating to native rights,
they argued, was therefore beyond the jurisdiction of the Inquiry.
Mr. Justice Berger rejected this argument and, in a series of pre-
liminary rulings, further defined his terms of reference and estab-
lished a structure for the Inquiry's hearings.
This structure distinguished two types of hearings. The one kind
was formal hearings to be held in the main centre of the Northwest
Territories, Yellowknife, in which the evidence of experts - engi-
neers, biologists, economists, sociologists, anthropologists - would
be heard, subject to full cross-examination by lawyers. The second
kind was community hearings which would be held in the towns
and villages of the North, which would be subject to special pro-
cedural rules to be worked out by a committee consisting of Com-
mission staff and all participants in the Inquiry. It was my task as
Special Counsel to Mr. Justice Berger to co-ordinate the work of
this committee. Mr. Justice Berger also ruled that the hearings
would not begin for a period of nine months in order to permit all
participants to prepare fully for the hearings.
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At one of the preliminary hearings George Kodakin, a Dene chief
from Fort Franklin, a native community of some 400 people on the
shore of Great Bear Lake, told Mr. Justice Berger that if he really
wanted to understand how native people felt about the proposed
pipeline he should come and live for a summer in his village. The
Judge, however, was committed to visiting as many places as pos-
sible in the Canadian North prior to the hearings to familiarize him-
self with the rich complexity of the land and all its people. It was
agreed, however, by the native organizations, that in my capacity
as Special Counsel with primary responsibility for the organization
of the community hearings, my family and I would move to the
North and spend as much time as possible living in several villages,
including Fort Franklin, in order to better understand how existing
procedures for holding hearings should be modified to enable the
native people to make a full contribution to the Inquiry.
In the course of the next nine months, from a base in two of the
native villages, I travelled with Mr. Justice Berger to many of the
northern communities to discuss the issue of community hearings.
While in Fort Franklin I sought the advice of people within the
village: the elected chief and council, the elders and the young
people. I went out on a number of occasions with hunting, fishing
and trapping parties and visited groups who had established hunt-
ing, fishing and trapping camps in the bush. During this time I
also consulted with native field workers, who had been hired by the
native organizations with the assistance of monies provided by the
Government of Canada on the specific recommendation of the
Commission, whose task it was to help people in the communities
prepare for the hearings. I also observed how meetings were held
within the village, both amongst the people themselves on such issues
as organizing the community caribou hunt and those which the
chief and council regularly had with government officials. There
was a stark contrast between the two kinds of meetings. The meet-
ings with government officials typically dealt with agendas predeter-
mined by the government upon which the chief and council were
being "consulted". Typically, government officials would fly into
Fort Franklin (the only other access was by boat) and, while their
planes waited on the runway or lake, the meeting would be hur-
riedly conducted. The meeting would be attended only by the chief
and a few councillors and was held in a small room in the village
office. On several occasions, when the temperature was forty degrees
below zero, the engines of the waiting plane kept running and pro-
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-vided a noisy accompaniment to the consultation process being held
in the office.
By contrast, meetings held by the Dene themselves dealt with
agendas of their own making and were carried out in conformity
with traditional patterns of decision-making. I quickly found out
that the Dene not only have a rich oral tradition, which naturally
develops oratory skills, but also have an entrenched pattern of
decision-making which operates by consensus. Issues are discussed
by heads of families and others who are respected for their skills
and knowledge and eventually a position or decision will emerge to
which everyone can subscribe. It is a participatory democracy which
puts the democratic traditions of most western societies to shame.
Issues are not necessarily settled at a single sitting. There is much
informal discussion within the community to ensure that all mem-
bers of the community are involved. The formal meetings are not
held in the village office but in the large log community hall which
is also used for traditional dances and other community events. A
meeting on an important issue will often be preceded by a com-
munity feast or followed by a community dance.
It was clear from my discussions with Chief Kodakin and other
people in Fort Franklin that when they heard that the hearings
would be held in communities to enable them to speak on the im-
pact of the Mackenzie Valley Pipeline they assumed that these
meetings would follow the government model. Their expectation
was that Mr. Justice Berger would fly in with his entourage, spend
a few hours talking with the chief and council, and leave. Such was
the accumulated experience of the Dene, M~tis and Inuit with the
process of government consultation and as a result it was a major
task to persuade them that, in this inquiry, things could be done
differently. I encouraged the community leaders to help fashion a
procedure which would ensure that their traditional model of hold-
ing meetings would be respected by the Inquiry, consistent with the
carrying out of its mandate.
In many ways my work during this period was indistinguishable
from the anthropologist who was spending the year in Fort Franklin
studying how native people use their traditional social structures in
formulating hunting strategies. Like him I was to be seen visiting
people in the village, sitting in their homes drinking tea, inviting
them to my log cabin to share a meal, going to meetings and under-
taking hunting trips. However, his task was to write an academic
treatise for his university, whereas mine was to fashion a procedure
to ensure that the Inquiry provided native people with a real oppor-
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tunity to express their views on matters relevant to the work of the
Inquiry.
It is here again that the integral relationship between procedure
and substance emerges. Prior to my visits to the communities, meet-
ings had already taken place between the native people, the govern-
ment, and pipeline company representatives concerning the proposed
Mackenzie Valley Pipeline. Native people had been asked to pro-
vide their views on the location of construction camps, compressor
stations and landing strips in relation to their communities, the
location of the pipeline route in relation to their traplines, employ-
ment opportunities and other matters to do with specific aspects of
the pipeline infrastructure. This process conceived of the potential
impact of the pipeline project in very limited ways. The pipeline
was analogized to "a string across a football field". In these meet-
ings government representatives sought to put to one side the issue
of native rights as being irrelevant to the task at hand which, as
they saw it, was to understand the specific impacts which the devel-
opment of the project would have on Indian communities and, to a
limited extent, on Indian economic activities. However, in my meet-
ings with native people it became clear that they did not view the
pipeline and its impact in this limited way. What emerged through
many hours of discussions was that the pipeline development could
not be separated from all the other developments which native
people had experienced since the time of their first contact with the
agents of colonialism. The pipeline was the latest and potentially
the most extensive intrusion into their traditional territory but it was
part of a continous process. They talked of the treaties which they
had negotiated in i9oo and 1921 with the Canadian Government.
Although these treaties in their text, like the others, state that the
Indians surrender all their rights to the land, the Dene insisted that
they understood the treaty to 'be one of peace and friendship, which
through its recognition of their rights 'to hunt and fish and trap
amounted to a guarantee of their rights to the lands and resources
on which their survival depended. They explained that their elders
had told the treaty commissioners that they would not sign the
treaty unless the government guaranteed that there would be no
interference with their way of life and with their right to govern
themselves. They described how, contrary to these treaty promises,
government and industry had moved into their territory, how their
traditional economic activities had been interfered with by mining
and oil and gas exploration undertaken without their consent, and
how they had been pressured into moving from their hunting camps
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into villages made in the image (albeit a poor image) of white
settlements. Young people explained how their forced exposure to
an educational system modelled exclusively upon white southern
lifestyles had alienated them from their own communities and, in
many cases, undermined their ability to communicate in their native
language with their parents and grandparents. Most of all they
talked of the sense of injustice and oppression which they felt as the
original people of the North whose views and rights to govern them-
selves in 'their own homeland had been systematically disregarded
again and again. They saw the pipeline project as the final assault
on their right to territorial and political integrity, because it would
bring about an influx of whites into the area and because the
massive scale of the project would generate other industrial activity.
It also became very clear in my discussions with native people in
their communities that not only did their concept of native rights
extend far beyond the narrow one articulated in the Calder case but
it also comprised claims to self-determination within Canadian con-
federation and .the essential right to determine the pace and scale of
development within their homeland.
What emerged from all this was that if the Inquiry was to under-
stand the social and economic impact of the pipeline project it must
understand the history of the native peoples, their cumulative ex-
perience with previous developments, the nature of their claims and
the impact which the project would have on the settlement of those
claims. In this way, the work of fashioning a procedure which per-
mitted native people to fully express their views resulted in a much
expanded conception of the substantive issues underlying the man-
date of the Mackenzie Valley Pipeline Inquiry.
The structure of the community hearings grew out of an under-
standing of the native procedures for decision-making. Thirty-five
community hearings were held in the Mackenzie Valley and the
Western Arctic at which over i,ooo witnesses gave evidence. Instead
of a typical government hearing lasting a few hours, hearings in
many of the villages went on for two and three days. Hearings
would start in the early afternoon and often would go into the early
hours of the morning. In many villages a traditional dance would be
held after the hearing to which the judge and the Inquiry staff
would be invited. The hearings in the villages were scheduled to
accommodate the natural rhythm of the native economy, revolving
around the caribou, muskrat, seal or polar bear hunt, trapping of
fine furs, and fishing. Thus the hearing in a particular village was
not scheduled at -times when the people were heavily involved in
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these activities. In several cases where a number of families had
established camps in the bush away from the main village, hearings
were held in these camps. At one hearing at Willow Lake Mr. Jus-
tice Berger, accompanied by a court reporter and representatives
from the pipeline company and the press, flew in to such a bush
fishing camp and, after a meal of trout and moose meat, held the
hearing in a tent. The meeting ended after midnight and the Judge
and his party were then transported by canoe down river to the
main village of Fort Norman where a hearing was held the next
day. The hearing at Willow Lake was held in the middle of sum-
mer at a time when the northern sun does not set. Another such
hearing was held in the Inuit hunting camp of North Star Harbour
high above the Arctic Circle in February at a time when the sun
barely arcs above the horizon. Though it was forty degrees below
zero, the plane's engines were shut down and there was no mechani-
cal accompaniment to the voices of the Inuit hunters who described
for Mr. Justice Berger what life on the land meant to them.
The content of the hearings varied from village to village. In Fort
Franklin elders spoke of their life before extensive contact with
white people, before the establishment of the settlement. The most
respected hunters were chosen to explain to the Judge the logistics
of hunting and the impact of oil and gas exploitation on this activ-
ity. Similarly, the most proficient fishermen explained the impact of
sports fishing by non-natives on fish populations in Great Bear Lake.
Young people told of their experiences with the educational system.
At this hearing and at many others people spoke about their rela-
tionship with the land: as security, the basis of identity, pride and
self-respect. They spoke of their relationship with animals as the
primary source of their distinctive economy, their value system, the
sharing ethic which underpinned their community life, -the role of
the elders in maintaining cultural and historical continuity, their
hopes for the future of their children and their demand that the
Government of Canada recognize their rightful claims to self-
government2
While every effort was made to ensure that the hearing process
accommodated native procedures for decision-making, there was
also the need to ensure that the process was perceived as having
integrity by other participants in the Inquiry and by the public.
One issue that had to be confronted was the question of cross-
24 See T. Berger, THE REPORT OF THE MACKENZIE VALLEY PIPELINE INQUIRY
(977) vol. I, esp. chs. 8, io and ii.
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examination of witnesses. This was a feature of the formal hearings
and in most Inquiries is usually regarded as a necessary part of the
hearing process. However, cross-examination by a lawyer in the con-
text of an adversary process was calculated to intimidate native wit-
nesses and effectively prevent their full participation. For the com-
munity hearings an accommodation was reached whereby all wit-
nesses were sworn to tell the truth and in a case where one of the
participants wished to ask questions of a witness these questions
were referred to either Mr. Justice Berger or myself. During the
course of the Inquiry other alternatives were developed, for example
a representative from the pipeline company was permitted to make
a statement at a suitable point in the hearing to deal with matters
which had been raised through the evidence of other witnesses.
All evidence was recorded and reproduced in the form of a per-
manent transcript of proceedings in exactly the same way as in the
formal hearings. There was to be no repetition of the treaty experi-
ence. Much of the evidence of the native people was given in their
own native languages and the Inquiry paid for native interpreters
chosen by the community. Due to the uniqueness of the Inquiry's
procedures and the intense national interest which the Mackenzie
Valley Pipeline Inquiry had generated, representatives of the Cana-
dian press corps were in attendance at almost every hearing. Part
of the media coverage was provided by the Northern Service of the
Canadian Broadcasting Company, the national radio and television
network, which provided a full-time team of reporters to cover the
Inquiry's hearings. This team included native reporters who pro-
vided daily broadcasts of the proceedings in the five native lan-
guages spoken in the North. This meant that native people in all the
villages were able to understand in their own language what had
taken place in other communities. This had the effect of reinforcing
the idea that the Inquiry process was indeed a break from the typi-
cal government consultation meetings and that the Inquiry was
serious in seeking native people's views.
The exposure of the hearings to the media meant that, over a
three-year period, people in southern Canada saw for the first time
on television and heard on radio broadcasts a clear articulation by
native people of their rights as original people in North America
and their demands that these rights be respected. The degree of
articulation was so great indeed that allegations were made that
these statements could not possibly be those of the native people
themselves, that their speeches were being written by white advisers.
No one in attendance at the community hearings would, however,
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make such an allegation. The depth of feeling conveyed in the
speeches of the native people of the North speaking in the main
without notes, in their own languages, left no doubt as to author-
ship. To anyone who had spent time in the communities or who had
come to understand the richness of native cultures it was not sur-
prising that people steeped in the oral tradition were able to pro-
duce so many orators. Yet to the majority of Canadians this was
all new. For the native people, of course, their concept of their rights
was not new. However, as one native spokesman said, "While the
people have always held these views, there was never a place for
these views to come out." The Mackenzie Valley Pipeline Inquiry
provided such a place. Perhaps the most complete articulation of
how native people perceive their rights was given by Robert Andre
of the community of Arctic Red River in the Mackenzie Delta. He
told Mr. Justice Berger the following:
We are saying we have the right to determine our own lives. This
right derives from the fact that we were here first. We are saying we
are a distinct people, a nation of people, and we must have a special
right within Canada. We are distinct in that it will not be an easy
matter for us to be brought into your system because we are differ-
ent. We have our own system, our own way of life, our own cultures
and traditions. We have our own languages, our own laws, and a
system of justice....
Land claims... [mean] our survival as a distinct people. We are a
people with a long history and a whole culture, a culture which has
survived.... We want to survive as a people, [hence] our stand for
maximum independence within your society. We want to develop
our own economy. We want to acquire political independence for
our people, within the Canadian constitution. We want to govern
our own lives and our own lands and its resources. We want to have
our own system of government, by which we can control and develop
our land for our benefit. We want to have the exclusive right to
hunt, to fish and to trap. We are saying that on the basis of our
[aboriginal] land rights, we have an ownership and the right to
participate directly in resource development.
We want, as the original owners of this land, to receive royalties
from [past] developments and for future developments, which we
are prepared to allow. These royalties will be used to fund local
economic development, which we are sure will last long after the
companies have exhausted the non-renewable resources of our land.
The present system attempts to put us into a wage economy as
employees of companies and governments over which we have no
control. We want to strengthen the economy at the community level,
under the collective control of our people. In this way many of our
young people will be able to participate directly in the community
and not have to move elsewhere to find employment.
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We want to become involved in the education of our children in
the communities where we are in the majority. We want to be able
to control the local schools. We want to start our own schools in
the larger centres in the North where we are in the minority....
Where the governments have a continuing role after the land settle-
ment, we want to have a clear recognition as a distinct people,
especially at the community level. Also at the community level, pow-
ers and control should lie with the chief and band council. To
achieve all this is not easy. Much work lies ahead of us....
We must again become a people making our own history. To be able
to make our own history is to be able to mould our own future, to
build our society that preserves the best of our past and our tra-
ditions, while enabling us to grow and develop as a whole people.
We want a society where all are equal, where people do not exploit
others. We are not against change, but it must be under our terms
and under our control.... We ask that our rights as a people for
self-determination be respected 5
It was on the basis of such statements by the native people that
Mr. Justice Berger in his report, Northern Frontier, Northern Home-
land,26 was able to expand upon the definition of aboriginal rights
which, as a lawyer, he had urged upon the Canadian courts, to
encompass much broader rights which relate to the original concept
of aboriginal rights in North America. This is how the Report of
the Mackenzie Valley Pipeline Inquiry characterized this broader
conception of aboriginal rights and its place in the Canadian legal
and political system:
The Native People are seeking a fundamental reordering of the
relations between themselves and the rest of Canada. They are seek-
ing a new confederation in the North. The concept of native self-
determination must be understood in the context of native claims.
When the Dene people refer to themselves as a nation, as many of
them have, they are not renouncing Canada or Confederation.
Rather they are proclaiming that they are a distinct people, who
share a common historical experience, a common set of values, and
a common world view. They want their children and their children's
children to be secure in that same knowledge of who they are and
where they come from. They want their own experience, traditions
and values to occupy an honourable place in the contemporary life
of our country. Seen in this light, they see their claims will lead to
the enhancement of Confederation - not to its renunciation.-
25 Id., at 171-72.
26 Supra, note 24.
27 Id., at 172.
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Mr. Justice Berger urged that no pipeline be built for at least ten
years to permit the native people and the Canadian Government
to negotiate and implement a settlement of native claims which
would ensure the achievement of this new confederation in the
North.
PART III: RECENT EXPERIENCE WITH THE NEW
PROCEDURAL FORUMS
The lessons learned from the Mackenzie Valley Pipeline Inquiry
in the shaping of a hearing process to permit native people a full
opportunity to articulate their experiences as colonized peoples and
their rights to self-determination as distinct peoples have not ended
with 'the Inquiry. The lessons have been applied and sharpened in
other subsequent public inquiries and more recently atempts have
been made by lawyers acting for native people to incorporate some
of these lessons into the conduct of court hearings. A review of two
instances of this in which I was directly involved illustrates the
importance of developing procedural forums which draw upon the
experience and knowledge of native people and how in turn such
forums extend and enhance an understanding of the cultures, soci-
eties and economies of the native people and a full appreciation of
the substance of their rights.
The first instance concerns a public inquiry established in 1980
by the Federal Minister of Health and Welfare, charged with the
mandate to inquire into Indian health and health care services in
the Alert Bay region of British Columbia. This region is some 250
miles north of the Province's largest city, Vancouver, and is the
home of about 25oo Indians of the Kwakiutl Nation. The inquiry
was precipitated by a number of deaths of young Indian children
which the Kwakiutl believed to be attributable to the incompetence
of the local medical practitioner. The Commissioner appointed to
head the inquiry was a doctor who had personal experience working
with Indian people. The procedure adopted by the inquiry was to
hold a series of community hearings in the main village of Alert Bay
which lasted for one week. Although the focus of the inquiry to
many outside observers seemed 'to be highly specific - the extent to
which Indians received proper medical care - the native people in
their evidence drew upon their own interpretations of health to
develop a broader focus for the inquiry. Defining health in Indian
terms as cultural, social and economic strength they described for
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the Commissioner their experiences with those who, over the past
one hundred years, had tried to 'draw the Kwakiutl's strength from
them; how missionaries and Indian agents tried to accomplish this
by changing the Indians' spiritual being by prohibiting the central
institution of their legal, economic and cultural tradition, the Pot-
latch, by taking over the education of their children through the
system of residential schools at which the speaking of native lan-
guages was punished. They described how the strength the Kwakiutl
drew from their traditional reliance upon natural resources, par-
ticularly the fishery, had been weakened 'by the activities of govern-
ment and industry, both of which drained away those resources and
restricted Indian involvement in activities which predated the pres-
ence of non-Indians by many thousands of years. The Indian wit-
nesses explained that the root causes of their lack of strength, poor
health and alcoholism were directly related -to the undermining of
their spiritual, cultural and economic self-sufficiency. They described
how in all these areas of non-Indian intrusions, they had resisted,
that they had asserted that, as original people, they had a distinctive
culture, a distinctive economy and distinctive rights. They told the
Commissioner that, as Indian people, they must regain control over
those matters central to their survival as Kwakiutl. Only then would
they regain their strength.
They explained to the Commissioner how they saw their health
in terms of the development of strong independent Indian commu-
nities drawing on the traditions of the past as their children faced
the challenge of tomorrow. Their recommendations therefore went
beyond the delivery of medical services and embraced the call for
the recognition of their rights to the heartland of their traditional
territory, the Nimpkish River Valley. They asserted that as original
people the Kwakiutl were the rightful owners and custodians of the
watershed and its resources, that they must be recognized as the
people who have the right to a controlling voice in the development
of those resources, that in the river was the source of their traditions,
the representation of their cultural continuity, the sustenance of
their people in the fish it provided for food and commerce, and in
the rich resource it offered to their children in their education. They
insisted that Indian priorities in the form of the enhancement of
the river system as a salmon resource be recognized by both federal
and provincial governments, that the competing activities of log-
ging, mining, recreation and settlement must be controlled in recog-
nition of the rights which the Kwakiutl have and the immense
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significance that the river valley represented to them in economic
and cultural terms.'
Because the inquiry came about due to a crisis in the delivery of
medical services, the community hearings also resulted in the presen-
tation to the Commissioner of a set of proposals related to the
delivery of medical services. In formulating these proposals, the na-
tive people had been assisted by a two-day workshop which had
been incorporated into the hearing process. This workshop, spon-
sored by the inquiry, brought to the community of Alert Bay indi-
viduals involved both in Canada and the United States with Indian
health care programmes. These individuals related their experiences
and the problems which their communities had encountered in seek-
ing to take over and direct the delivery of medical services. Based
on the workshop and upon their own ideas, the native people of
Alert Bay proposed the establishment of a native-controlled health
board which would take over from existing government services and
shape a health care delivery service fully responsive to native peo-
ple's needs. The health board would operate as an agency of Indian
government. In addition to taking on the usual responsibilities of a
health board the Kwakiutl envisaged that a native health board
would, in terms of research, look to the important area of tradi-
tional Indian medicine - the native health sciences - and consider
ways in which an understanding of this knowledge could be inte-
grated into the treatment of Indian people.
Following the report of the Commissioner which broadly en-
dorsed the Kwaldufs proposals, the Kwakiutl signed an agreement
with the Minister of Health and Welfare for the establishment of
the first full-time native health board in Canada. As a direct result
of the work of this health board and of the broader understanding
reached with the Federal Government on the distinctive health
needs of Indian people, a new Indian health centre has recently
been completed in Alert Bay. The underlying problems which gave
rise to this inquiry have not gone away but, as a result of the
inquiry process, there has emerged a much more complete under-
standing of these problems and of how real solutions to them can
be achieved.
The second example concerns litigation on the issue of Indian
25 See final submission of the Nimpkish Band Council to the Federal Inquiry
into Health Care in Alert Bay, transcript of proceedings, vol. 3, at 906
et seq.
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hunting rights. Broadly speaking, the Canadian courts have pro-
vided little legal recognition for traditional Indian hunting rights
and have subjected them to both federal and, with some exceptions
in the case of treaty guaranteed hunting rights, provincial wildlife
regulation. In large measure this represents an ethnocentric lack of
understanding of the cultural, social and economic roles which hunt-
ing and fishing still continue to play in the life of native commu-
nities; hunting and fishing are not simply recreational activities but
are the very stuff of a distinctive native identity. As I have de-
scribed, the kind of evidence presented at community hearings is
capable of clearly articulating the essence of native identity and the
relationship of Indian hunting and fishing to that identity. It is not
wholly surprising therefore that lawyers acting for native people
have sought to expand on the type of evidence which is presented
to the court in the defence of Indian hunting rights against the
intrusion of wildlife regulation.
R. v. Jack and Charlie' illustrates this process. The case, which
started in 1979 and is now on appeal to the Supreme Court of
Canada, is unique in Canadian jurisprudence in that for the first
time Indian religious practices as they relate to hunting were put
before a court of law. In this case the two defendants, members of
the Tsartlip Indian Band of the Coast Salish Nation of Vancouver
Island, accompanied by the wife of one of them, were involved in a
hunt for deer which was required for a religious ceremony practiced
by the Coast Salish Indians. This ceremony involves the ritual burn-
ing of food for the dead in the belief that the smoke therefrom will
provide sustenance for the deceased person for whose benefit the
burning is undertaken. It is part of this religious practice that the
food which is burnt be of a kind -that the deceased person usually
ate. In the Jack and Charlie case the burning was for Mrs. Jack's
great-great-grandfather who died last century and whose usual food
was deer meat. Mrs. Jack had endeavoured to obtain such meat
from other members of the Indian band without success. The hunt
therefore had been organized as a religous mission. The charges
which were laid against the defendants involved the possession of
deer meat outside of the open season for the hunting of deer.
The defence of freedom of Indian religion had never been raised
before and it was only after the most careful deliberation that the
2 The judgments of the B.C. County Court and Court of Appeal are reported
at (1982) 67 C.C.C. (2d) 289.
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chief and elders of the Tsartlip Indian Band decided that they
would describe for the court the nature of their religious practices.
Their great concern was that these practices would be ridiculed and,
in the process, their most cherished beliefs and spiritual values would
be shown the same lack of respect as non-Indians had shown other
integral aspects of Indian life. At the trial, elders of the Band de-
scribed for the court the distinctive nature of the religious ceremony
of burning food for the dead and the spiritual basis of the ceremony,
that the deceased depart only in body but their spirits remain and
require continuing sustenance. They described how this religious
ceremony provided the necesary link over time between generations
that already had passed and those that were yet to come and how
the elders were seeking to use traditional religious ceremonies, in-
cluding the burning ceremony, to help those members of the band
who were experiencing difficulty with alcohol or drugs by reaffirm-
ing their roots as Indian people and -their ties to the Indian com-
munity. Evidence was also given by the most respected elder of the
Coast Salish people, the medicine man, who officiated at the burn-
ing ceremony and who visited the Coast Salish people 'both in Can-
ada and the United States as a religous leader, -cementing the his-
torical, religious and cultural ties between peoples whose relation-
ships had been established many thousands of years prior to the
formation of the Canadian-United States boundary. The trial was
attended by over one hundred Indian people from the Band who
lent the weight of their presence to the commitment of the Indian
witnesses to the way of life they were seeking to defend. What
emerged clearly from this evidence was that the hunting of deer in
this case was in pursuit of a religous quest, was integrally related to
the practice of Indian religion and was rooted in the fabric of
Coast Salish life.30
3o The evidence at trial is summarized by the Provincial Court Judge at (x98 1)
50 C.0.C. (2d) 337. The B.C. Court of Appeal (67 C.C.C. (2d), at 297),
in a two to one decision affirming the conviction of Jack and Charlie, held
that "while freedom of religion is a fundamental right, the authorities bind-
ing on us make it clear that the freedom must be exercised in accordance
with the general law." Mr. Justice Hutcheon, dissenting, held at 307 that
"the Wildlife Act ought to be read so as to acknowledge the right of Jack
and Charlie on these facts to practise their religion where no competing
interest of society exists."
A second hunting case, R. v. Dick (0983) 3 C.C.C. ( 3d) 481, illustratesthe importance of introducing the evidence of native people as to the special
significance of their traditional economic activities in order to permit a court
to understand fully the legal issues involved. In this case, Arthur Dick, a
member of the Alkali Lake Band, was charged with killing a deer out of
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It is significant that in the Jack and Charlie case the evidence of
anthropologists, which has been the primary evidence relied upon in
cases in the United States where freedom of Indian religion has
been raised, was given a secondary role. The evidence of an anthro-
pologist was used in Jack and Charlie to provide ethnographic sup-
port for the primary evidence of the people themselves who were
the rightful source of their own history and religion. This was in
keeping with what took place in the Mackenzie Valley Pipeline
Inquiry. I have described how, in addition to the community hear-
ings, there were also formal hearings in which experts gave evidence.
Many of these experts were anthropologists and sociologists who told
Mr. Justice Berger about their research on the cultures and econo-
mies of the people of the North. Although this evidence was given
careful consideration by the Judge, it was placed in the context of
his direct exposure to the life of the native people and to the evi-
dence of the one thousand witnesses who spoke at the community
hearings. The new procedural forum of community hearings leaves
no doubt as to who are the true experts on the history, culture,
society and economy of the native people of Canada.
season. Nine members of the Alkali Lake Band and three members of the
Canoe Creek Band gave evidence describing their lives and the significance
of the rituals of food gathering. They told of their dependence on moose
and deer for food and for traditional and valued items of daily and cere-
monial clothing. Mr. Justice Lambert, in summarizing the evidence, con-
cluded at 491, "It is impossible to read the evidence without realizing that
killing fish and animals for food and other uses gives shape and meaning to
the lives of the members of the Alkali Lake Band. It is at the centre of what
they do and what they are." The legal argument of Arthur Dick was directly
related to this evidence. That argument was, firstly, that "there is a central
core of Indianness that cannot be touched by provincial legislation but only
by the Parliament of Canada under ss. 24 of s. 91 [of the Constitution Act,
1867] 'Indians and lands reserved for Indians'. Foraging for food by the
active hunters of the Alkali Lake Band was an activity within that central
core of Indianness. It was beyond the scope of the Wildlife Act" (at 485-86).
The second and closely related argument was derived from the judgment of
Mr. Justice Dickson in R. v. Manuel and Kruger (1977) 34 C.C.C. (2d)
377, where he identified the indices by which a provincial law of general
application which, under s. 88 of the Indian Act, is made applicable to
Indians, would cease to be such a law. The argument was that in relation
to the hunting activities of the Alkali Lake Band members, the Wildlife Act
was not a law of general application but rather one which impaired their
status and capacities as Indians. Mr. Justice Lambert alone of the three
member Court of Appeal accepted this argument. As in R. v. Jack and
Charlie, the issue is now before the Supreme Court of Canada. It is signifi-
cant that in both the Jack and Charlie and the Dick cases, counsel for the
Indian hunters had been involved in the West Coast Oil Ports Inquiry. This
Inquiry, presided over by Dr. Andrew Thompson, had made extensive use
of the community hearing process in order to better understand the relation-
ship of Indian people to the fishery resources of the coast and rivers of
British Columbia.
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CONCLUSION
The Canadian experience illustrates how procedural forums which
respect and reflect the law ways of native peoples can be developed,
that through these procedural forums a fuller understanding of na-
tive societies and native rights can emerge, an understanding which,
in the words of Mr. Justice Berger, can enhance the nature of
Canadian Confederation. Canada has now given constitutional rec-
ognition to the rights of native people but has done so in highly
equivocal terms. In the Constitution Act of 1982 it is provided in
section 35 that:
The existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples
of Canada are hereby recognized and affirmed.31
The equivocation in this form of constitutional recognition re-
lates directly to the central issues of this article. Whose concept of
aboriginal and treaty rights is entrenched in section 35 of the Con-
stitution Act, the concept of the aboriginal people themselves or that
of the Canadian courts?32 To resolve what will otherwise be a col-
lision course between these two concepts of substantive rights, the
Constitution Act establishes a procedural mechanism in section 37.
It provides that there shall be convened a constitutional conference
which shall have included in its agenda an item respecting constitu-
tional matters -that directly affect the aboriginal peoples of Canada,
including the identification and definition of the rights of those
peoples to be included in the Constitution of Canada. This consti-
tutional conference was held in March i983. Native people, in
approaching the Section 37 Conference, formulated proposals which
reflected their concept of their rights. They sought to entrench
31 Constitution Act 1982, as enacted by the Canada Act 1982, c. ii (U.K.)
proclaimed in force 17 April 1982.
2 For a further analysis of this equivocation see D. Sanders, The Rights of
the Aboriginal Peoples of Canada (1983) 61 CAN. B. R v. 314; K. Lysyk,
The Rights and Freedoms of the Aboriginal Peoples of Canada, in W. Tar-
nolpolsky and L. Beaudoin (eds.), THE CANADIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND
FREEDOMS (1982), at 467; M. B. Slattery, The Constitutional Guarantee of
Aboriginal and Treaty Rights (1983) 8 QUEEN'S L.J. 232. The original
version of s. 35 did not contain the word "existing". This version was dropped
from the patriation package in the interests of achieving provincial consent
to patriation. In the face of national protest the clause was reinstated. How-
ever, at the insistence of some of the provincial Premiers, the word "existing"
was added to qualify the rights affirmed and recognized. To native people
this only reinforced the argument that the form proposed of entrenchment
ensured that native rights would be interpreted within the narrow contours
of Canadian case law.
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definitions of aboriginal and treaty rights which went beyond the
narrow court interpretations and which included rights to self-
government, rights to practise their own distinctive laws and reli-
gions, and rights to their traditional lands, waters and resources.
They sought to entrench the principle of consent into the constitu-
tional amending formula in relation to matters which affected native
rights. Finally, they sought to entrench an ongoing process for future
constitutional conferences to complete the task of constitutional re-
newal with native people. Underlying the discreet elements of their
proposals was the assertion by Canada's native peoples that they
have the right to self-determination. They have sought to buttress
this claim, not only by reference to their status as the original peoples
of Canada but also by reference to international covenants to which
Canada is a signatory. In particular, the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights provides:
All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that
right they should freely determine their political status and freely
pursue their economic, social and cultural development. 33
Until the eighteenth century the native peoples of North America
through diplomatic procedures girded by military strength were
able to compel recognition of this right. The two hundred years since
the Royal Proclamation of 1763 have witnessed in Canada the
abrogation of this right by governments and the courts. Much has
been learned through the new procedural forums exemplified by the
community hearings of the Mackenzie Valley Pipeline Inquiry as
to the original nature of native peoples' right to self-determination
and the process of colonialism which has led to its abrogation. The
Constitutional Accord of March 1983 provides for further consti-
tutional conferences to discuss constitutional matters that directly
affect the aboriginal peoples of Canada." The true measure of the
accords which will emerge from future constitutional conferences
will be whether they can reverse the process of internal colonization
and pour real substance into the right of the original peoples of
33 Canada acceded to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
on 19 May 1976. For a discussion of developments in international law and
native rights, see D. Opekokew, THE FIRST NATIONS: INDIAN GOVERNMENT
IN THE COMMUNITY OF MAN (1982); D. Sanders, The Re-Emergence of
Indigenous Questions in International Law (I983) 1 CANADIAN YEARBOOK
OF HUMAN RIGHTS.
34 1983 Constitutional Accord on Aboriginal Rights, First Ministers' Conference
on Aboriginal Constitutional Matters.
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Canada to self-deternination within the framework of a new Cana-
dian Constitution."5
35 Judged by this measure, the second First Ministers' Conference was not a
progressive step. In November 1983, the Report of the Parliamentary Com-
mittee on Indian Self-Government (the "Penner Report") recommended that
the right of Indian peoples to self-government be entrenched in the Consti-
tution. In March 1984, on the first day of the two-day First Ministers' Con-
ference, the Prime Minister tabled a constitutional amendment which, as
explained by the Minister of Justice, was designed to entrench in a non-
justiciable form a commitment to the principle of native self-government
which would bind the federal and provincial governments only to an ongoing
process of negotiation with native peoples to determine the content of the
principle. Yet, even this limited proposal, which fell far short of the native
people's own proposals, did not win the support of any more than three
provinces. The conference ended without any Accord.

